We consider the problem of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) trying to reduce its exposure to electricity market volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting. We focus on the day-ahead electricity market, wherein the LSE has a good estimate of the statistics of the wholesale price of electricity at different hours in the next day, and wishes its customers to move a part of their power consumption to times of low mean and variance in price. Based on the time of usage, the LSE awards a differential number of "Energy Coupons" to each customer in proportion to the customer's electricity usage at that time. A lottery is held periodically in which the coupons held by all the customers are used as lottery tickets.
Our study takes the form of a Mean Field Game, wherein each customer models the number of coupons that each of its opponents possesses via a distribution, and plays a best response pattern of electricity usage by trading off the utility of winning at the lottery versus the discomfort suffered by changing its usage pattern. The system is at a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if the number of coupons that the customer receives is itself a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We show the existence of an MFE, and characterize the mean field customer policy as having a multiplethreshold structure in which customers who have won too frequently or infrequently have low incentives to participate. We then numerically study the system with a candidate application of air conditioning during the summer months in the state of Texas. Besides verifying our analytical results, we show that the LSE can potentially attain quite substantial savings using our scheme. Our techniques can also be applied to resource sharing problems in other societal networks such as transportation or communication.
INTRODUCTION
There has recently been much interest in understanding societal networks, consisting of interconnected communication, transportation, energy and other networks that are important to the functioning of society. These systems usually have a shared resource component, and participants have to periodically take decisions on when and how much to utilize such resources. Research into these networks often takes the form of behavioral studies on decision making by the participants, and whether it is possible to provide incentives to modify their behavior in such a way that the society as a whole benefits [1, 2] . Our candidate application in this paper is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) (e.g., a utility company) trying to reduce its exposure to daily electricity market volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting. The reason for our choice is the ready availability of data and reliable models for the cost and payoff structure that enables a realistic study. For instance, consider Figure 1 , which shows the (wholesale) price of electricity at different hours of day during the summer months in Texas. The data was obtained from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) [3] , an organization that manages the deregulated wholesale energy market in the state. The price shows considerable variation during the day, and peaks at about 5 PM, which is the time at which maximum demand occurs. A major source of this demand in Texas is air conditioning, which in each home is of the order of 30 kWh per day [4] . Incentivizing customers to move a few kWh of peak-time usage to the sides of the peak each day could lead to much reduced risks of peak price borne by the LSE. Such demand shaping could also have a positive effect on environmental impact of power plant emissions.
As an example, consider a customer that every day transfers 3 kWh of energy from 5 − 6 PM to off-peak times by increasing the usage by 1 kWh in 3 − 4 PM, by 0.5 kWh in 4 − 5 PM, and by 1.5 kWh at 7 − 8 PM. As we will see later, even such a small daily demand shift, when conducted over a fifty homes, can yield substantial savings of the order of a hundred dollars per week to the LSE. However, doing so could potentially cause a small increase in the mean and deviation of the internal home temperature, which is a discomfort cost borne by the customer. In our system, the LSE awards a number of "Energy Coupons" to the customer in proportion to his usage at the non-peak times, and these coupons are used as tickets at a lottery conducted by the LSE 1 . A higher number of coupons would be obtained by choosing an option that potentially entails more discomfort, and would also imply a higher probability of winning at the lottery.
In our analytical model, each agent has a set of actions that it can take in each play of a repeated game, with each action having a corresponding cost. Higher cost actions yield a higher number of coupons. At the end of each play, the agents participate in a lottery in which they are randomly permuted into groups, and one or more prizes are given in each group. The state of each agent is measured using his surplus, which captures the history of plays experienced by the agent, and is a proxy to capture his interest in participating in the incentive system. Each win at the lottery increases the surplus, and each loss decreases it. Furthermore, we assume that the agent has a utility function that is concave and increasing in the surplus. This captures the idea that each successive win yields a reduced marginal happiness to the agent. Any agent could depart from the system with a fixed probability, and a departing agent is replaced by a new entrant with a randomly drawn surplus. How would agents decide on what action to take at each play?
Mean Field Games
The problem described is an example of a repeated Bayesian game, wherein each player has to estimate the actions of all his potential opponents at the current lottery (and in the future), play a best response, and update his beliefs about their states of surplus based on the outcome of the lottery. However, since the set of agents is large and, from the perspective of each agent, each lottery is conducted with a randomly drawn finite set of opponents, an accurate approximation for any agent is to assume that the states of his opponents (and hence actions) are independent of each other. This is the setting of a Mean Field Game (MFG) [5] , which we will use as a framework to study equilibria in societal networks. Here, the system is viewed from the perspective of a single agent, who assumes that each opponent's action would be drawn independently from an assumed distribu-tion, and plays a best response action. We say that the system is at a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action turns out to be a sample drawn from the assumed distribution.
We will use such a MFG model to model dynamics in societal networks. Our framework to study MFGs is based on work such as [6, 7] . In [6] the setting is that of advertisers bidding for spots on a webpage, and the focus is on learning the value of winning (making a sale though the advertisement) as time proceeds. In [7] , apps on smart phones bid for service from a cellular base station, and the goal is to ensure that the service regime that results has low per-packet delays. In both works, the existence of an MFE with desired properties is proved. Although our high-level methodology is similar, our discrete state space, surplus dynamics and reward structure are quite different, necessitating a new approach. Our objective in this paper is to design a system that would incentivize the convergence of user action profiles to one that would result in large savings to the LSE.
Demand Response in Deregulated Markets
Demand Response is the term used to refer to the idea of customers being incentivized in some manner to change their normal electricity usage patterns in response to peaks in the wholesale price of electric power [8] . Many methods of achieving demand response exist, including an extreme one of turning off power for short intervals to customers a few times a year if the price is very high. In return, customers expect a subsidy, often in terms of a reduced electricity bill.
The idea is particularly relevant in deregulated electricity markets that exist in several US states such as Texas, wherein the firm that serves customer demand might have no infrastructure of its own, and merely buys on the wholesale market and sells to the home consumer. Customers have a choice between many different LSEs that they can obtain service from. For instance, many urban neighborhoods in Texas are served by 5−10 LSEs and customers can periodically choose to sign contracts of 1, 6 and 12 months with them.
Our system model of offering coupons at certain times of day is based on the idea presented in [9] , which suggests offering such incentives to coincide with the predicted realtime price peaks. In [10] , this kind of system is modeled as a Stackelberg game with two stages; setting the coupon values followed by consumer choice. Decision making is hence myopic. Unlike these models, we are interested in repeated consumer choice, particularly when the number of such customers is large. Our ideas of having a weekly lottery, and with consumers appearing, participating and disappearing periodically (say over a year) accounts for this kind of large system behavior with repeated decision making.
Organization and Main Results
We begin by introducing our mean field model in Section 2. Our model is well suited to large scale systems in which any given subset of agents interact only rarely. This kind of system satisfies a Chaos hypothesis that enables us to use the mean field approximation to accurately model agent interactions. The state of the mean field agent is his surplus, which forms a Markov process that increases by winning and decreases by losing at the lottery.
In Section 3 we develop a characterization of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be distributed, but with each participant getting at most one by withdrawing the winner in each round. Each lottery is played amongst a cluster of M agents drawn from a random permutation of the set of all agents. While the exact form of the lottery is not critical to our results, we present it for completeness. Our next step, presented in Section 4, is to characterize the best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dynamic programming formulation. We find that under our assumptions the value function of certain state of surplus is increasing, continuous and submodular. Further, we show using this result that given our ordering in which higher cost actions result in a higher probability of winning the lottery (due to more coupons being given), the choice of one action versus another depends on thresholds in the surplus.
The probability of winning the lottery defines the transition kernel (along with the regeneration distribution) of the Markov process of the surplus, and hence maps an assumed distribution across competitors states to a resultant stationary distribution. In Section 5-6 , we consider the question of the existence of a fixed point of this kernel, which is the MFE. Since we have a discrete action and state space, showing a fixed point in the space of stationary distributions is quite intricate.
We next conduct numerical studies in Section 7, on utilizing our framework to the context of electricity markets. We develop an accurate model of the daily usage of electricity in each hour, using available measurements over several months in Texas. We also use the data on wholesale electricity prices during the interval to calculate what times of day would yield the best returns to rewards. We show that if customers are willing to transfer as little as 12 minutes of AC usage each day to off-peak periods, then each week the LSE gains a benefit of the order of a $100 over a cluster of 50 homes. Further, we show that such behavior can be incentivized by offering a weekly prize of $40 at the lottery.
Finally, we conclude in Section 8. Our mean field model of societal networks is quite general, and can be applied to different incentive schemes that are currently being proposed in the field of public transportation and communication network usage. We also briefly discuss plans for conducting user trials of the Energy Coupon system.
MEAN FIELD MODEL
We consider a general model of a societal network in which the number of agents is large. Agents have a discrete set of actions available to them, and must take one of these actions at each discrete time instant. The actions result in the agents receiving coupons, with higher cost actions resulting in more coupons. The agents are then randomly permuted into clusters of size M and a lottery is held using the coupons to win real rewards. Thus, agents must take their actions under some belief about the likely actions, and hence the likely coupons held by their competitors in the auctions. Figure 2 illustrates the mean field approximation of our model, which is an accurate representation of the Bayesian system when the number of agents is large [6, 11] . The diagram is drawn from the perspective of a single agent (w.l.o.g, let this be agent 1), who assumes that the actions played by each of his opponents would be drawn independently of each other from the probability mass function ρ. In this section, we will introduce the notation, costs and payoffs of the agent, and provide a brief description of the policy space and equilibrium. Agents: As discussed above, the total number of agents is infinite, and in the MFG, we consder a generic agent 1 who in each lottery will be opposed to M − 1 agents drawn randomly from the infinite population.
Actions: We suppose that the agent of interest has exactly n actions. We denote the action space as A = {1, 2, · · · , n}, with cardinality A = |A|. Hence, the action that this agent takes at time k is a[k] ∈ A. Under the mean field assumption, the actions of the other agents would be drawn independently from the p.m.f ρ = [b1, b2, · · · , b |A| ], where ba is the probability mass associated with action a. We call ρ as the assumed action distribution.
States: The agent keeps track of his history of wins and losses in the lotteries by means of his net surplus at time k, denoted x[k]. The value of surplus is the state of the agent, and is updated in a Markovian fashion as follows:
where w and l is the impact of winning or losing on surplus. Effectively, the assumption is that the agent expects to win at least an amount l at each lottery. Not receiving this amount would decrease his surplus. Similarly, if the prize money at the lottery is w + l, the increase in surplus due to winning is w. Surplus values are discrete, and the set of possible values is given by a countable X, that ranges from [−∞, +∞].
Utility: The impact of surplus on the agent's happiness is modeled by a utility function u(x[k]), which is concave and monotone increasing. Concave utility is a standard feature of many game theoretic models, and in our context captures the idea that each successive win at the lottery brings di-minishing increases in happiness. Note that the agents are risk neutral, since we do not consider second order statistics (such as variance or standard deviation) as part of the utility function. This choice is motivated by studies such as [1, 2] that indicate that greater participation is observed when using (risky) lotteries as opposed to small deterministic (safe) rewards.
Costs: Each action a ∈ A taken at time k has a corresponding cost θa. This cost is fixed and represents the discomfort suffered by the agent in having to take that action.
Coupons: When agent takes an action a, it is awarded some fixed number of coupons ra for playing that action. These coupons are then used by the agents as lottery tickets.
Regeneration:
We assume that an agent may choose to quit the system at any time. This event occurs with probability 1 − β, where β ∈ (0, 1). When this happens, a new agent takes the place of the old one, and his state is drawn from a probability mass function Ψ.
Best Response Policy: The agent must choose an action at each time. The green/light tiles in Figure 2 relate to the problem of the agent determining his best response policy. The agent assumes that the actions taken by each of his M − 1 opponents are drawn independently from probability mass function ρ. Given this assumption, the state of his surplus is x and current utility is u(x), the agent must calculate the probability of winning at the lottery pρ,a(x), if he were to take action a(x) ∈ A, incurring a cost θ a(x) and gaining r a(x) coupons. Since the agent must take this decision repeatedly, he must solve a dynamic program to determine his optimal policy. The details of the lottery and how to calculate the probability of success are given in Section 3. The properties of the best response policy are described in detail in Section 4.
Stationary Distribution and MFE:
A best response policy creates a map between the assumed action distribution ρ and the state transition kernel of the Markov chain corresponding to the surplus, via the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a(x). This is illustrated by means of the blue/dark tiles in Figure 2 . The transition kernel also is influenced by the regeneration distribution Ψ. The stationary distribution of surplus associated with the transition kernel is denoted Πρ. This stationary distribution of the single mean field agent is equivalent to the one-step empirical state distribution of infinite agents who all assume that the actions of their competitors would be drawn from ρ and take a best response. This distribution generates the state x, which results in an action a(x). If the distribution from which a(x) is a sample, denoted Γρ, is the same as the assumed coupon distribution ρ, the system is at an MFE. Details of the proof of existence are provided in Section 6.
LOTTERY SCHEME
We first construct the lottery scheme that will be used in the mean field game. We permute all the agents into clusters, where there are exactly M agents in each cluster, and conduct a lottery in each such cluster. Suppose there are only K rewards for all agents in one cluster, where K is a fixed number less than M . When an agent takes an action, he/she will receive the credit (number of coupons) associated with that action. Then the probability of winning is based on the number of coupons that each agent possesses. We will model the lotteries as choosing a permutation of the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K of them as winners. Then different lottery schemes can be interpreted as choosing different distributions on the symmetric group of permutations on M . In particular, we will use ideas from the Plackett-Luce model to implement our lotteries.
W.l.o.g., we assume that the actions are ordered in decreasing order of the costs so that θ1 ≥ · · · ≥ θA. In order to incentivize agents to take the more costly actions we will insist that the vector of coupons obtained for each action is also in decreasing order of the index, i.e., r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rA.
The specific lottery procedure we consider is the following: for every agent m that takes action a[m] and receives coupons r a[m] > 0, we choose an exponential random variable with mean 1/r a[m] and then pick the first K agents in increasing order of the realizations of the exponentials 2 . Let the agent m = 1, . . . , M receive r a[m] number of coupons. The set of winners is a permutation over the agent indices, and we denote such a permutation by σ = [σ1, σ2, · · · σM ]. We then have the probability of the permutation σ given by
Essentially, after each agent is chosen as a winner, he is removed and the next lottery is conducted just as before but with fewer agents.
We now analyze the probability of winning in our lottery.
For analysis under the mean field assumption, it suffices to consider agent 1 with the coupons it gets by taking action a being denoted as r a [1] . Let M := {2, . . . , M }, which is the set of opponents of agent 1. For these agents, suppose there are υn agents that choose action n, where n∈A υn = M −1.
We denote the vector of these actions by υ = (υ1, . . . , υA).
The conditional probability of agent 1 failing to obtain a reward is given by
where L refers to the fact that agent 1 "loses," M1 = M, and for l ≥ 2 we have M l = M l−1 \ {κ l−1 }. Essentially, the above looks at the lottery process round by round, and is a summation of the probabilities of all permutations in which agent 1 does not appear in the first spot in any round.
The above expression considerably simplifies if the summations are instead taken over the actions that the lottery winner at round κ can take 3 . Given a coupon/action profile υ, let J ( υ) denote the actions that have non-zero entries.
Additionally, by υ − 1κ for κ ∈ J ( υ) denote the resulting coupon profile obtained by removing one entry at location κ, and by r υ the sum of all the coupons in profile υ, i.e., κ∈J ( υ) rκυκ. Then
where υ 1 = υ, for l = 2, . . . , K, υ l = υ l−1 − 1κ l and υ l κ is the number of entries at location κ for coupon profile υ l . Note that p L 1, υ is a decreasing function of r a [1] for every υ. Therefore, agent 1 comparing two actions i and j that have r1,i > r1,j will find p L 1, υ (i) < p L 1, υ (j) for all υ. Also by taking the limit of r a [1] going to 0, having an action with 0 coupons results in a loss probability of 1 for every υ. Now, the actions of the opponents are drawn from the distribution ρ under the mean field assumption . Hence, the probability of obtaining the coupon profile (equivalently action profile) of the opponents υ = (υ1, . . . , υA) is given by the multinomial formula, i.e.,
Using (3) and (4), we obtain the winning probability for the mean field agent 1 when taking action a as
By lower bounding each term in the conditional probability of not obtaining a reward we get pρ,a ≤ 1 − M −K M ( r A r 1 ) K =: p W ∈ (0, 1). If we ran the lottery without removing the winners (and any of their coupons), we obtain a lower bound on the probability of winning that has a simpler expression. Using this simpler expression we can obtain the further lower bound pρ,1
. Note that both bounds are independent of ρ. If we allow an action that yields 0 coupons, then the above bounds become trivial with p W = 1 and p W = 0.
An important feature of our lottery scheme is that the probability of winning increases with the number of coupons given out. We assumed a fixed reward for any win. However, we can extend the lotteries to ones where different rewards are given out at different stages and also where the rewards are dependent on the number of coupons of the winner. For the latter, we will insist on the rewards being an increasing function of the number of coupons of the winner. Finally, we can also extend to scenarios where we choose the number of stages K is an (exogenous) random fashion in {1, . . . , M −1}.
BEST RESPONSE POLICY
As discussed in Section 2, the mean field agent must determine the optimal action to take, given his surplus x and the assumed action distribution ρ. We follow the usual quasilinear combination of utility and cost consistent with Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and under which the impact of winning or losing at a lottery is on the surplus of the agent (and not simply a one-step myopic value change). Thus, the dynamic program that the agent needs to solve is
Note that pρ,a is a result of a lottery that we described in detail in Section 3.
First, we need to define a set of functions as
Also define the Bellman operator Tρ as
where f ∈ Φ.
Properties of Vρ
We now develop results on useful properties of the optimal value function, which we will use later on to characterize the optimal policy.
The fixed point f * of operator Tρ is the unique solution of Equation (6)
Proof. See Section A.1 for details.
Next, we show that the value function Vρ(x) is increasing and submodular (i.e., decreasing differences) in x.
Lemma 2. Given the distribution of action ρ, Vρ(x) is an increasing and submodular function of x.
Proof. See Section A.2 for details.
Proof. For any given ρ, from Lemma 1 we know that there is a unique Vρ(·). Furthermore, it is the unique fixed point of operator Tρ where T J ρ is a contraction mapping with constant α3 that is independent of ρ. From (7) , it follows that T J ρ is a continuous in ρ: computing derivatives using the envelope theorem and the expressions from Section 3, it is easily established that T J ρ is, in fact, Lipschitz with constant (M − 1) J when the uniform norm is used for ρ.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two population/action profiles such that ρ1 − ρ2 ≤ (the choice of norm is irrelevant as all are equivalent for finite dimensional Euclidean spaces). As T J ρ is continuous in ρ, there exists a δ > 0 such that
Applying T J ρ 1 n times and using the contraction property of T J ρ 1 , we get
The proof then follows since limn→∞ T nJ ρ 1 Vρ 2 − Vρ 1 Ω = 0 so that
Furthermore, using the comment from above we can show that Vρ is Lipschitz continuous in ρ.
Existence of Threshold Policy
In Section 3, our lotteries will be constructed such that the probability of winning monotonically decreases with the cost of the action. This when combined with the monotonicity and submodularity (decreasing differences) of Vρ yields the following characterization of the best response policy.
Lemma 4. For any two action, say actions a1 and a2, suppose that θa 1 > θa 2 , so that pρ,a 1 > pρ,a 2 , then there is a threshold value of the surplus queue for user such that preference order for the actions changes from one side of the threshold to the other.
Proof. For any x ∈ X we have
As we assumed θa 1 > θa 2 , it follows that pρ,a 1 > pρ,a 2 . Also, since w + l > 0 and Vρ(x) is increasing in x, so both sides of the above inequality are non-negative. Since Vρ(x) is submodular, the RHS is a decreasing function of x. Let x * a 1 ,a 2 ∈ X be the smallest value such that LHS ≥ RHS, then for all x > x * a 1 ,a 2 action a2 is preferred to action a1, for all x < x * a 1 ,a 2 action a1 is preferred to action a2, and finally, if at x * a 1 ,a 2 LHS=RHS, then at x * a 1 ,a 2 the agent is indifferent between the two actions, and if instead LHS > RHS, then action a2 is preferred to action a1. We call x * a 1 ,a 2 the threshold value of surplus for actions a1 and a2.
Then we have an immediate corollary from this result. Corollary 1. With A actions with costs θ1 > · · · > θ |A| and probability of winning pρ,1 > · · · > p ρ,|A| , define the increasing and piece-wise linear convex function g(y) = maxa∈A(pρ,ay − θa). Let y0 = 0 < y1 < · · · < yL < yL+1 = +∞ where L ≤ |A| − 1 are the break-points of g(y), then there exists an ordered (in decreasing order) sub-setÃ = {i1 = |A|, i2, . . . , iL, iL+1 = 1} of A such that for all y ∈ (y l−1 , y l ), g(y) = pρ,i l y − θi l for l = 1, . . . , L + 1 so that arg maxa∈A(pρ,ay − θa) = {i l }. Additionally, for y l for l = 1, . . . , L, 
Then an optimal policy at surplus x is a set-valued function that is upper semicontinuous in ρ and is given by
The restriction to the extremal actions at point x with multiple possible actions is owing to the Lipschitz continuity of the winning probabilities and Vρ in ρ and the submodularity of Vρ so that differences are positive and bounded above. Essentially, in a small enough ball around ρ, there cannot exist other population profiles that will not take either one or both of the extremal actions taken at x for ρ and instead take an intermediate action. We omit the details owing to space considerations. This characterization above allows us to map the surplus to the action space for every ρ. The monotonic nature of the policy will be critically used in obtaining the mean-field equilibrium.
MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
The action distribution ρ is a probability mass function on the action set A: let bi be the probability of choosing action i. Note that ρ lives in the probability simplex on R |A| which is compact and convex. Definition 1. Given the action distribution ρ, determine the success probabilities in the lottery scheme using (5) and then compute the value function in (6) . Then taking the best response to (6) by following the optimal policy from Corollary 1 yields transition kernels for the surplus Markov chain and stationary distributions for the surplus, ζρ (with each transition kernel having a unique stationary distribution). Thereafter, applying the threshold policy yields the distribution of actions, Γρ, possibly set-valued. Then we say that a given ρ and (randomized) threshold policy constitutes a mean field equilibrium (MFE) if ρ ∈ Γρ.
Stationary distributions
For a generic agent, w.l.o.g., say agent 1, we consider the state process {x1[k]} ∞ k=0 . It's a Markov chain with countable state-space X. and it has an invariant transition kernel given by a combination of the optimal policy a * ρ (·) from Corollary 1 and the lottery scheme from Section 3. By following this Markov policy, we get a process {W [k]} ∞ k=0 that takes values in {win, lose} with probability p ρ,a * ρ (x 1 [k−1]) for the win, drawn conditionally independent of the past (given x1[k]). Then the transition kernel conditioned on W [k] is given by
where B ⊂ X and Ψ is the probability measure of the regeneration process for surplus. The unconditioned transition kernel is then
Lemma 5. The Markov chain {x1[k]} ∞ k=0 with transition kernel (11) is positive recurrent and has a unique stationary distribution.
Proof. From (11), we satisfy the Doeblin condition as
where 0 < β < 1, and Ψ is a probability measure. The result then follows from results in [12, Chapter 12].
MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM:PROOF
Theorem 1. Given the action distribution ρ, and the success probability pρ,a, for a ∈ A, by taking the best response to (6), we have partially ordered set of stationary distributions for the surplus, ζρ. Furthermore, by the threshold policy, we get a convex set of distribution of actions (generated by a partially ordered set of distributions), Γρ. Then we say that the given ρ and (randomized) threshold policy constitutes a mean field equilibrium (MFE) if ρ ∈ Γρ.
It's obvious that Γρ and ζρ are indeed probability distributions. a) We first show that the ζρ can be chosen to be upper semicontinuous in ρ. Proof. We will start by conditioning on regeneration not occurring for the chosen user. For each x ∈ X with a * ρ (x) = {a(x), a(x)} (where a(x) is the action with the higher cost and higher probability of winning), we have the possibility of choosing either extremal action. This leads to a multitude of choices for the transition kernel by determined by the choice function at each of these points. If at x with a * ρ (x) = {a(x), a(x)} we choose a(x), then
If instead we choose a(x), then
Therefore, fixing ρ we can obtain a finite set of transition kernels (which will be shown to be a poset) by choosing different extremal actions at all points x with |a * ρ(x) | = 2. For any sequence {ρn} n∈N we can find a sub-sequence that picks a specific subset of extremal actions at all points x where |a * ρ(x) | = 2 and coincides with ρ otherwise. For this subsequence, the one-step transition kernels without regeneration are continuous. Therefore, mapping ρ to all possible one-step transition kernels obtained by different choices of extremal actions is upper semicontinuous.
There is a subtle point that we should discuss before proceeding. We strongly believe (without proof) that there are population profiles where a * ρ (x) is single-valued for all x ∈ X so that we get a unique transition kernel.
We will now show that the set of all possible transition kernels for a given ρ (if more than one exist) is a partially ordered set with the ordering given by stochastic ordering and that this ordering carries over to the k-step transition kernels and then to the stationary distribution of surplus.
For this it suffices to show the ordering when we choose different actions at one location. We will choose one specific x with |a * ρ (x)| = 2 and given λx ∈ [0, 1], we determine a family of transition kernels by setting
For the other x with |a * ρ (x)| = 2 we make a fixed choice of the extremal actions. On the other hand, we have for an x ∈ X with |a * ρ (x)| = 1 and for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
Using this definition we note the one-step transition kernel without regeneration for a chosen λ ∈ [0, 1] to be ζ ρ,λ = P λ .
Next we note a few definitions from [13] .
Definition 2. Let X and Y be two discrete random variables taking values on the same totally-ordered set S and let µx and µy be their corresponding probability distribution vectors. X(µx) is said to be larger than Y (µy) in stochastic
Definition 3. The chain {Z n } n∈Z + is said to be larger than the chain {Z n } n∈Z + in stochastic ordering, denoted by
Definition 4. A transition kernel Q is said to be stochastically increasing if for all i, j ∈ S with i > j:
where Q(·, i) denotes the one-step transition distribution conditioned on the state being i.
If two transition kernels Q and Q are such that they are both stochastically increasing and Q (·, i) ≥ st Q (·, i) for all i ∈ S, then by Theorem 4.2.5a and Equation (4.2.16 ) in [13] , the chain {Z n } n∈Z + with transition kernel Q is larger than the chain {Z n } n∈Z + with transition kernel Q in stochastic order, if Z 0 and Z 0 have the same distribution. Note that this is equivalent to saying that the n-step transition kernels are such that (Q ) n (·, i) ≥ st (Q ) n (·, i) for all i ∈ S and for all n ≥ 1. If, in addition, Q and Q are both irreducible, aperiodic and positive-recurrent, then the stationary distributions are such that π ≥ st π .
Lemma 7. Given the action distribution ρ and λx ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique stationary, ζ ρ,λx of the surplus for every λx. In addition, ζ ρ,λ 1 ≥ st ζ ρ,λ 2 for every λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] with λ1 > λ2 for every fixed ρ.
Proof. We will apply the stochastic ordering definitions to our transition kernels ζ ρ,λx . The total order on X for our purposes is given by x1 ≺ x2 if and only if x1 > x2. Now using the characterization of the optimal policy from Corollary, it follows that for every λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] with λ1 > λ2, ζ ρ,λ 1 and ζ ρ,λ 2 are stochastically increasing, and furthermore, ζ ρ,λ 1 (·, x) ≥ st ζ ρ,λ 2 (·, x) for all x ∈ X by (12) and (13) . Therefore, it follows that ζ
for all x ∈ X and n ≥ 1. Note that the poset of k-step transition kernels has a maximum element and a minimal element which obtained from the one-step transition kernels that always choose either the highest cost action or the lowest cost action.
For the surplus, we have for every λx ∈ [0, 1]
Note that from the stochastic ordering of ζ (k) ρ,λx in λx and since the initial state is chosen with common distribution Ψ, it follows that ζ ρ,λ 1 ≥ st ζ ρ,λ 2 for every λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] with λ1 > λ2.
Again fixing ρ we can pick different extremal actions at all points x with |a * ρ(x) | = 2 and use the same logic as before to obtain a finite partially ordered set of stationary surplus distributions. This poset has a maximum element where only higher cost action is preferred and a minimum element where only the lower cost action is preferred at all points. Denote this set by Zρ. Then the map we consider is from ρ to Zρ. For any sequence {ρn} n∈N we can find a sub-sequence that picks a specific subset of extremal actions at all points x where |a * ρ(x) | = 2 and coincides with ρ otherwise. For this subsequence, the transition kernels without regeneration are continuous and using the dominated convergence theorem, we find convergence of the stationary distribution of surplus to a specific point in Zρ. This then demonstrates the upper semicontinuity of the map from ρ to Zρ.
For a given ρ, we obtain the poset of stationary surplus distributions Zρ. Each of these introduces a population profile based on the specific combination of actions chosen at the breakpoints used to generate the stationary surplus distribution. Denote this set of distributions as Γρ. Note that this is also a poset (again with a maximum and minimum element) as it inherits the ordering from the stationary surplus distributions. LetΓρ be the convex hull of Γρ. b)Next we show the upper semicontinuity of the mapping Π * : ρ → Γρ.
Theorem 2. The mapping Π * : ρ → Γρ is upper semicontinuous with Π * (ρ) being non-empty. Moreover, Π * (ρ) will be convex if we consider the mapping ρ →Γρ.
Proof. The upper semicontinuity of the mapping from ρ to Γρ follows just the same as for the transition kernels and the stationary surplus distributions. Recall thatΓρ is the convex hull of Γρ. This yields the set-valued map Π * which maps population profiles to population profiles (a compact and convex subset of l1) is upper semicontinuous for every ρ, Π * (ρ) is non-empty and convex. Now using Kakutani's fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point ρ * satisfying ρ * ∈ Π * (ρ * ).
NUMERICAL STUDY
We now conduct an empirical data-based simulation in the context of electricity usage for home air conditioning to illustrate the performance our system. Besides the data on electricity prices available from ERCOT [3] , we also used a data set from Pecan Street [4] containing the ambient temperature over June-August, 2013, as well as customer electricity usage with a 15 minute resolution for 40 homes in Austin, TX. The data set differentiates between air conditioning and other energy consumption, and hence is a good resource to validate usage models. Our first step is to model the usage of electricity for air conditioning by an average home in Texas over the course of a day. While we present the case of homogeneous homes that all have identical parameters, it is straightforward to extend our results to the case where there are a finite set of classes of homes, and the participating homes are drawn randomly from these classes.
Home Model
A standard continuous time model [14, 15] for describing the evolution of the internal temperature τ (t) at time t of an air conditioned home iṡ
Here, τa is the ambient temperature (of the external environment), R is the thermal resistance of the home, C is the thermal capacitance of the home, η is the efficiency, and P is the rated electrical power of the AC unit. The state of the AC is described by the binary signal q(t), where q(t) = 1 means AC is in the ON state at time t and in the OFF state if q(t) = 0. The state is determined by the crossings of user specified temperature thresholds as follows:
A number of studies investigate the thermal properties of typical homes. We use the parameters shown in Table 1 for our simulations. These are based on the derivations presented in [14] for conditioning a 250 m 2 home (about 2700 square feet), which is a common mid-size home in many Texas neighborhoods. In order to determine the energy usage for AC in our typical home, we need to have an estimate of how the ambient temperature varies over a day in Texas during the summer months. These values are available in the Pecan Street data set, and we plot the average values over three months for Austin, TX in Figure 3 .
Next, we calculate the ON-OFF pattern of our typical air conditioner based on the ambient temperature variation over the course of the day. We do this by simulating the controller in (19) with the appropriate ambient temperature values taken from Figure 3 . The pattern is presented in Figure 4 . We see that there is higher energy usage during the hotter times of the day, as is to be expected. This also corresponds to the peak in wholesale electricity prices shown for the same period in Figure 1 . The total energy used each day corresponding to our 4 ton AC (= 14 kW; see Table 1 ) is 30.42 kWh. For comparison, we use the Pecan Street data set to provide the measured daily average energy usage for AC during the same period for 4 homes that have parameters in the same ballpark as our typical home. These values are shown in Table 2 .The table shows the close match of our home model with real AC usage patterns. 
Actions and Costs
The customer action space in our problem consists of choosing when to turn ON and OFF the AC, and is uncountably infinitely large. We need to pick a reasonable discrete subset of the action space for our study. We find from the home model that 13.6 kWh of energy is consumed during the interval of 3 − 8 PM. The amount of energy used in each hour during this period in kWh and the corresponding ON time in minutes for the AC are shown in the first four columns of Table 3 . From Figure 1 it is clear that the consumption during maximum price period 3 (5 − 6 PM) has the maximum impact on the overall energy cost of the LSE. The LSE would like to incentivize the shift of some of this usage, without excessively affecting the internal home temperature. We assume that the actions available to the customer involve transferring energy from period 3 to the cheaper periods indexed by 1, 2, 4 and 5. Energy transfer implies increasing the AC ON time, and we choose a transfer unit of 2 minutes. For example, transferring a unit to the period 3 − 4 PM would imply running the AC for 2 minutes longer during that time period.
The final column of Table 3 shows the energy used in terms of our transfer unit, and we need to define actions in terms of transferring usage from period 3. Since the total usage during that period is 6.25 units, we choose to transfer a maximum of 6 units from that period. Each action can now be identified with a transfer vector (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5), where yj indicates the number of units transfered to the period j. Hence, the vector (0, 0, 6, 0, 0) would indicate the baseline in which the customer does not transfer any usage from period 3. This defines the action set A, and we define the action with index a = 0 to be the no-transfer action. Our next step is to calculate the cost of taking each action a ∈ A, which corresponds to the discomfort of having a potentially higher mean and standard deviation in the home temperature due to that action. We measure the state of the home under action a ∈ A by the tuple consisting of the mean temperature and the standard deviation, denoted [τa, σa]. The baseline state of these parameters is under action 0, denoted by [τ0, σ0.] Then we define the cost of taking any action a as
where we choose λ = 10 to make the numerical values of the mean and standard deviation comparable to each other. Note that the calculation of cost for each action involves simulating the home under that action to determine [τa, σa].
However, this has to be done only once to create a look-up table, which can be used thereafter.
Coupons, Lottery and Surplus
We now consider the incentives provided to the customers by the LSE, which wishes to generate an MFE that has most of its mass on actions that are beneficial to it. We measure the hazard experienced by the LSE per unit load as the weighted sum of the mean and standard deviation of the day-ahead price of electricity. Denoting the mean price at time period j by πj and the standard deviation by φj, we define the hazard of peroid j measured in dollars/MWh as hj(πj, φj) = πj + αφj,
where α models the risk that the LSE perceives. We assume that α = 1 in what follows. Each action vector of a customer would impose a net hazard on the LSE in proportion to the usage. We define the differential hazard measured in dollars imposed by an action y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) versus z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) as
where k converts the transfer units (minutes) into MWh. Setting y as the baseline action (0, 0, 6, 0, 0) presents a way of measuring the reduction/increase in hazard due to the incentive scheme. We will use this metric to quantify the value of the MFE achieved. Now, the baseline action a = 0 corresponds to a usage of 6 units in period 3 at which both π3 and φ3 are highest ( Figure 1) . Hence, the LSE should incentivize actions that are likely to reduce the differential hazard by offering Energy Coupons in proportion to the usage during the corresponding periods. The problem of optimally selecting these coupons is a hard one in general. However, in the limited context of our simulation, it is intuitively clear that coupons must be placed at periods of lower hazard. Our coupon choices are shown in Table 4 . Given the coupon placement by the LSE, the customers need to determine the costs and number of coupons resulting from each action, and use these values to estimate the utility that they would attain. There are a total of 210 action vectors, but most are dominated by other actions and would never be used. We identified 6 actions that appeared to have the most promise of being used, and these shown in Table 5 with their attendant costs and number of coupons received. Note that action 0 is the one in which the customer does not participate in the system.
The LSE conducts an auction each week across clusters of M = 50 homes in each auction. For each cluster, there is (3, 0, 0, 2, 1) 1.747 341.5 K = 1 prize for winning the lottery with a value of $40 (we will show in the next subsection that this choice is viable). We assume that the customers choose the same action on each day of the week, and then participate in the lottery.
The final few parameters of our simulated system need to be determined by experiment, but in the absence of data until we conduct user trials, we make reasonable assumptions. We assume that the customer expects to win at least $1 on average by participating. Hence, the value of decrease in surplus due to losing is l = 1, while the value of increase in surplus by winning is w = 40−1 = 39. The customer expects nothing if he does not participate (action 0), and there is no change of surplus in this case. We assume that customers are likely to remain in the system with probability 0.98, i.e., the average customer participates for 50 time steps, which roughly parallels the fact that many home users sign a new contract once a year. Further, a newly entering customer has a surplus that is an integer uniformly drawn from [30, 50] . Finally, we assume that the customer utility , which maps surplus (in dollars) to utility units u(x) = 200(1 − e −x/150 ), i.e., the customer gets satiated by winning more and more quite gradually.
Under this model, we expect a user who has lost a number of lotteries to stop participating in the system, since his surplus goes negative and he is not receiving enough of an incentive to stay, given the cost he bears each day. Similarly, a user who has won too many times would have a large surplus, and would also not be keen on participating since the marginal utility he gets may not be high enough for him. While we expect the latter event to occur very infrequently, the former is something that we have to watch out for, since it would result in a poor customer response to our system and potentially less savings to the LSE. In what follows, we will see that our selected value of $40 reward appears to be sufficient to ensure a good level of participation.
Mean Field Equilibrium
We now are ready to determine the properties of the MFE generated by our system. We start with a uniform action distribution as the initial condition. We run the system over 50 iterations, determining the steady state action distribution at each step and using that as the input for the next iteration. We find that convergence occurs quite quickly and reaches within 0.1% of the final value within 10 iterations. Figure 6 shows the convergence of the stationary probability of having certain surplus values for a few examples. The eventual values to which they converge is the mean field surplus distribution. The complete mean field distribution of surplus is shown in Figure 7 . It indicates that customers win at a lottery between 1 and 2 times over an average lifetime of 50 time intervals, as is to be expected with a cluster size of 50 customers at each lottery. Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the mean field action distribution. For example, the best action from the LSE's perspective is action 1, which is chosen with probability 0.61. We use mean field action distribution to find that the net reduction in hazard over 50 homes is $92 each week. Thus, incentivizing customers by offering a prize of $40 each week is certainly feasible. The MFE illustrates that even as small a shift as 12 minutes of AC usage each day over several homes can yield significant benefits. For an LSE the size of Champion Energy, a major provider in several states with about a million home customers, quite substantial savings of the order of millions of dollars can result. In this paper we developed a general framework for analyzing incentive schemes to promote desirable behavior in societal networks by posing the problem in the form of a Mean Field Game (MFG). Our incentive scheme took the form of awarding coupons in such that higher cost actions would correspond to more coupons, and conducting a lottery periodically using these coupons as lottery tickets. Using this framework, we developed results in the characteristics of the optimal policy and showed the existence of the MFE.
CONCLUSION
We used the candidate setting of an LSE trying to promote demand-response in the form of inducing the transfer of energy usage from a higher to a lower price time of day for an air conditioning application. We conducted data driven simulations that accurately account for electricity prices, ambient temperature and home air conditioning usage. We showed how the prospect of winning at a lottery could potentially motivate customers to change their AC usage patterns sufficiently that the LSE can more than recoup the reward cost through a likely reduced expenditure in electricity purchase.
Our setup is general enough to capture population behavior in other societal networks. For example, it applies in an essentially unchanged manner to an experiment conducted on a bus transportation system of an IT firm in India, described in [1] . Here, employees have a choice of an early morning bus that experiences low traffic congestion or a later one that experiences more. Providing incentives to employees in the form of lottery tickets for taking the earlier bus was shown to increase its attractiveness, while simultaneously reducing costs to the firm by running a smaller number of buses at higher fuel efficiency.
In the future we intend to conduct user trails of the Energy Coupon system. This is something that we are actively working on, and such trials would both validate the idea of using incentive schemes to promote cooperation, as well as suport our analytical prediction of being able to run a viable societal system with desired behavior using the MFE framework.
APPENDIX A. DETAILS OF PROOFS A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We first show that Tρf ∈ Φ for ∀f ∈ Φ. The proof then follows through a verification of the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in Puterman [16] . From the definition of Tρ in (7), we have
From this it follows that
Let x+ be the unique positive surplus such that u(x+) = 1 and x− be the unique negative surplus such that u(x−) = −1. Note that Ω(x) is non-decreasing for x ≥ x− and nonincreasing for x ≤ x+. To avoid cumbersome algebra we will assume x+ − w > 0 and x− + l > 0. Since Ω(x) ≥ |u(x)| ≥ 0 and Ω(x) ≥ 1, the first two terms are bounded by 1 and maxa∈A θa. For the last term we have
We have the following
For x ≥ x+, we know using monotonicity of u(·)
Therefore, by the mean value theorem and u(·) being concave
Similarly, we have
Now we have the following
Using the same logic as before but noting that the derivative of u(·) is increasing as x → −∞, we get
For the analysis we assume that u(·) is such that sup x∈X u (x) < +∞. Thus, there exists an α0 ∈ (0, +∞) such that Tρf Ω ≤ α0.
Next, we need to verify the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in Puterman [16] . The lemma requires verification of the following three conditions. x[k] is the state variable denoting the surplus at time k. We need to show that ∀x ∈ X, for some constants (independent of ρ) α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and 0 < α3 < 1, 
for some J > 0 and all possible action sequences, i.e., aj ∈ A for all j = 0, 1, . . . , J − 1 with the distribution of x[J] chosen based on the action sequence (a0, a1, . . . , aJ−1) chosen.
First consider (23). Since Ω(x) = max(|u(x)|, 1), using the earlier analysis in Section 3, (23) is true with α1 = 1 + maxa∈A θa. Now consider (24). We have ≤ β J max(p W , 1 − p W ) J max(Ω(x + Jw), Ω(x − Jl)) ≤ (β max(p W , 1 − p W )) J α4(J)Ω(x) for some affine α4(J) > 0 using our analysis from before. It now follows that take J large enough we obtain an α3 < 1 that is also independent of ρ. Note that we can get a simpler bound of using just the properties of Ω(·). Again we can take J large enough to obtain a α3 < 1 that is independent of ρ. This bound is useful when there is an action for which the probability of winning or losing is 1. Since all the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 of Puterman [16] are met, then the first result in the lemma holds true. The second then follows immediately from (6).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let f ∈ Φ, suppose that f is an increasing and submodular function. First we prove that Tρf is increasing and sub modular too. Let a * (x) be an optimal action in the definition of Tρf (x) when the surplus is x, i.e., one of the maximizers from (7) . Let x1 > x2, then 
The first inequality holds because a * (x2) need not be an optimal action when the surplus is x1.
Again, let x1 > x2 and let x > 0. Since u(·) is a concave function, it follows that it is submodular, i.e., Assuming that f ∈ Φ is submodular, we will now show that Tρf is also submodular. Consider
Tρf (x1 + x) + Tρf (x2) = u(x1 + x) + u(x2) − θ a * (x 1 +x) − θ a * (x 2 ) + β p ρ,a * (x 1 +x) f (x1 + x + w) + p ρ,a * (x 2 ) f (x2 + w) + (1 − p ρ,a * (x 1 +x) )f (x1 + x − l) + (1 − p ρ,a * (x 2 ) )f (x2 − l)
We assume without loss of generality that p ρ,a * (x 1 +x) ≥ p ρ,a * (x 2 ) and let δ be the difference; if p ρ,a * (x 1 +x) ≤ p ρ,a * (x 2 ) , then a similar proof establishes the result. Using this we have the RHS (denoted by d) being where the last inequality holds as using the optimal actions (a * (x2 + x), a * (x1)) yields a higher value as opposed to the sub-optimal actions (a * (x1 + x), a * (x2)) when the surplus is x2 + x and x1.
Since both the monotonicity and submodularity properties are preserved when taking point-wise limits, choosing f (·) ≡ 0 (or u(·)) to start the value iteration proves that the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and submodular.
